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New Wine in Old Wineskins
Questioning the Value of Research Questions in Rhetorical Criticism
Richard E. Paine
North Central College
Recent years have seen a trend toward the inclusion and heightened valuing of research questions in
competitive Rhetorical Criticism (Communication
Analysis). The inclusion of this content element is
quite a new phenomenon on the national-level competitive circuit. In fact, the absence of such research
questions in competitive speeches was highlighted
by Ott as recently as 1998. But by 2007-2008, the
inclusion of a research question was established as
essentially de rigueur for a vast number of judges.
For example, consider the ballots received this past
year by a competitively successful rhetorical criticism entry I coached. At one tournament, all five
ballots written in response to this speech (2 in Prelims, 3 in Finals) wrote the research question at the
very top of the ballot. For four of the five judges,
their assessment of the handling of this question was
clearly central to the scores they assigned. Three
questioned the quality of the question: (1) “this is a
big question to ask based on this one incident,” (2)
“Islamaphobia: relevant, but a bit out of the public
consciousness (for a while now),” and (3) “your research question needs clearer, specific focus – you
could apply it to many artifacts. How can you focus
the question on this specific artifact?” The fourth
judge meanwhile focused on the adequacy of the
question‟s answer, stating that the response needed
to be “extended.” Ballot comments about this
speech‟s research question continued throughout the
year – requiring this aspect of the speech to be the
single most frequently rewritten and rethought aspect of the speech across the length of the competitive season.
To borrow language from many Persuasive
speakers, “this is not an isolated incident.” As both a
coach and a frequent tab-room worker, I have read
innumerable ballots written by critics judging this
event. Research questions have clearly become a
crucial component in many judging paradigms. Given the precipitous rise of this speech component, it is
important that we assess the nature and worth of
emphasizing research questions in competitive rhetorical criticism. In order to do so, we will: first, establish a philosophical perspective from which to
answer the question (we will privilege the vision of
forensics as an “educational liberal art”); second,
speculate about the reasons why this element has so
quickly gained favor among judges; third, assess the
degree to which this element meshes with other required elements of competitive speeches in this cate-

gory; and fourth and finally, propose a paradigm
shift.
A Philosophical Grounding
The philosophy we accept dictates the forensics
world we build. Ott (1998) stresses this fact, opening
his article with a quotation from Faules (1968),
which states: “At some time during a teacher‟s career
he [sic] will be asked to explain why he [sic] is asking
students to perform in a certain way or to carry out a
particular task. His answer will determine whether
he is an educator or [simply] a trainer, whether he
himself is educated, and whether he has considered
the reason for his beliefs. The educator knows the
„why‟ of what he does, and to him theory and conceptual knowledge take precedence over conditioned
responses….Pedagogy is generated by theory, and
theory comes from a philosophy which is grounded
in certain values (p. 1).”
Perhaps the most popular metaphor used over
the years to frame the discussion of forensics-aseducation has been McBath‟s “educational laboratory” (1975). For example, Burnett, Brand, and
Meister (2003) point to Ulrich (1984) and Whitney
(1997) as examples of community members who
have relied on this metaphor. But while the laboratory metaphor can be interpreted in quite positive
ways (particularly if we envision the laboratory as a
place where exploration and risks are dared within a
safe environment), this metaphor becomes problematic if we envision the laboratory as a site where
“one right answer” (a single Platonic “Truth”) is envisioned as the ultimate end sought. Thus, Aden‟s
definition of forensics as a “liberal art” (1991) may be
a more satisfying way to conceptualize the field. In
any case, a significant numbers of scholars have
stressed the significance of educational goals in forensics. Others, however, question this vision. Instead, some believe it is better described as a competitive playing field – a world in which education is
an appealing shibboleth but competition is a fullblooded reality. Thus, Burnett, Brand and Meister
(2003) title their article “Winning is Everything:
Education as Myth in Forensics.” Providing an explanation for this title, they write: “current practices
in forensics focus on competition and not on an often-referenced education model….although forensics
can be viewed as both an educational and a competitive activity, the practice of competition co-opts education. In Burke‟s terms, through the focus on com-
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petition, we have developed a „trained incapacity‟ to
focus on the merits of education….Our training at
best blinds, and at the least clouds, the mythic “educational” virtues of the forensics community (p. 12).”
In the face of these two visions of our activity,
this essay is committed to a value paradigm which
asserts the primacy of educational values over competitive values. While the activity undeniably is highly competitive in nature, my concern is with what I
see as the “ultimate justification” for forensics. The
position staked out here asserts that the value of forensics is massively diminished if it is defined primarily as an act of competition. This is not to deny
that competitive is a powerful and valuable teacher
of many valuable concrete skills and mental perspectives. However, I believe that competitive goals are
too often privileged to the detriment of more important ethical, practical, emotional, spiritual, and lifelearning educational goals. Thus, as applied to the
question at hand, this paper seeks to determine
whether or not the inclusion of research questions in
competitive rhetorical criticism: (1) does or does not
make “logical sense” within the context of critical
writing at this level of educational growth among
students, and (2) does or does not help students to
better prepare for graduate work in communication
studies (or related fields).
Why Have Judge-Critics Embraced
the Use of Research Questions?
The answers suggested here in response to this
question are at best speculative. I have not yet attempted to gather any empirical data on this subject,
and so I am relying on informal conversations, a
reading of the extant literature, a study of various
ballots written by judges, and my own instincts in
order to reach my conclusions. Tentatively, I believe
that the circuit‟s turn toward research questions is
based in part upon: (1) a general desire for change in
the event/activity, (2) a desire to deepen the level of
thinking (cognitive complexity) demanded by the
event, (3) a desire to connect students more deeply
to the scholarly traditions of our discipline, and (4) a
desire to clarify the extant judging criteria (an urge
for additional standardization).
First, humans desire change. While we appreciate continuity and tradition, we also want to try
new things and take new paths. We need to believe
that we have new insights to offer, new discoveries to
make, new vistas to look out over, new roads others
have not seen before that deserve to be traveled.
When it comes to academia, schools periodically
create new “Five Year Plans” that project goals and
objectives for the future that will take them beyond
where they stand at present. Academic departments
periodically review their curricula and major/minor
tracks with an eye toward updating and enhancing
them. Instructors regularly rethink the individual
courses they teach, looking for ways (both minor and
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/ndcieproceedings/vol4/iss1/25
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major) to improve them. This general urge certainly
applies to the educational laboratory of forensics at
large as well as to the written and unwritten “rules”
the community employs in relation to the individual
speaking events. We do not want to “do the same
thing forever.” Nor do we need to. Nor should we. In
fact, even the quickest glance at the field of rhetorical criticism as an academic discipline demonstrates
the need to evolve our practices. As noted by Foss
(1989, p. 71), the modern-day pursuit of rhetorical
criticism can be (in a certain sense) dated to its birth
in 1925 with the publication by Herbert A. Wichelns
of his article “The Literary Criticism of Oratory.” For
the next forty years or so, Neo-Aristotelianism constituted the virtually singular track critics trod in
their work. But this all changed in the mid-1960‟s,
triggered by the work of Edwin Black. As a field, we
discovered that there were a lot more ways to look at
rhetoric, a lot more tools available to dissect it, a lot
more questions to ask about it, and a lot more insights to be derived from it. Today, rhetorical critics
revel in and rely on the freedom to study a vast array
of rhetorical artifacts from a plethora of perspectives. These perspectives are typically grounded in
the work or other critics, but each work of criticism
is a unique blend of past knowledge, a particular
rhetorical artifact, and the unique insights of the
particular critic. No critic is “locked in” to the boundaries established by another. To a very meaningful
degree, each writer is free to write and rewrite the
rules they individually play by. Thus, as it relates to
competitive forensics, it makes sense that our community “bucks against traditional constraints” and
wants to find new ways to pursue this event.
Second, in our role as educators we genuinely
yearn to teach our students more. One aspect of this
desire is particularly relevant here. Adherents of the
traditional Western style of thinking, we want our
students to demonstrate their ability to think in
depth by showing us that they can connect the fragments of their thoughts on any given subject in a
linear and maximally-realized way. Including a research question, at first glance, appears to be a way
to demand greater coherence in speeches. It‟s presence implies that the student has followed a logical
and mentally progressive process in writing the
speech: they must have begun with an artifact, which
then gave birth to a research question, which then
caused the student to search for and locate the “ideal
tool” by which to answer that question, which then
demanded an application of the tool to the artifact,
which then (through the application process) produced a clear and coherent answer to the question.
This is, after all, the research paradigm associated
with the “hard sciences” we often idealize and seek
to emulate. Littlejohn (1983) defines the process of
academic inquiry accordingly:
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Inquiry involves processes of systematic, disciplined ordering of experience that lead to the
development of understanding and knowledge….Inquiry is focused; it involves a planned
means or method and it has an expected outcome. The investigator is never sure of the exact
outcome of inquiry and can anticipate only the
general form or nature of the results. These
scholars also share a general approach to inquiry
that involves three stages. The first and guiding
stage of all inquiry is asking questions. Gerald
Miller and Henry Nicholson [1976], in fact, believe that inquiry is „nothing more…than the
process of asking interesting, significant questions…and providing disciplined, systematic answers to them.‟…the second stage of inquiry is
observation….The third stage of inquiry is constructing answers. Here, the scholar attempts to
define, to describe and explain, to make judgments. This stage, which is the focus of this
book, is usually referred to as theory. (p. 9)
This general process substantially reflects the standardized outline we expect students to employ when
writing competitive rhetorical criticism speeches
today: ask a question, observe the phenomenon (apply a rhetorical method to a rhetorical artifact as a
lens through which to view its properties), and then
answer the question (derive critical conclusions).
Thus, many judges may well believe that they are
enhancing the education of the students they critique by requiring them to present clear and pointed
research questions. In this context, the use of research questions is perceived by judge-critics as a
valuable addition to the educational laboratory.
Third, as rhetorical scholars ourselves, we seek
to pass on the knowledge of our field to our students.
We want to aid them as they begin the journey toward becoming rhetoricians. Ott (1998) reminds us
that “[t]he academic discipline of speech communication and the activity of intercollegiate forensics are
natural allies….Collectively, these two traditions
represent a unique intersection of theory and practice (p. 53).” Accordingly, LaMaster (2005) observes
that “Rhetorical Criticism is modeled after academic
rhetorical criticism” (p. 32). At some level, we hope
and intend that participating in this competitive
event will better prepare our students for possible
future study in the discipline. The value of working
with this event for students who are considering
going on to graduate school is often stressed – and
indeed, a significant number of forensics competitors ultimately pursue careers in the area of rhetorical scholarship.
A fourth reason also can be suggested as to why
judge-critics have embraced the inclusion of research questions in competitive speeches. As participants in forensics, we feel a constant pressure toward higher levels of standardization. We want to be
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able to evaluate students as fairly as possible. We
feel pressure to offer “mainstream” comments that
demonstrate our understanding of and adherence to
“unwritten rules” that enhance the do-ability of
coaching and the predictability of results. As a rising
number of our colleagues talk about and vote on the
basis of research questions, the likelihood that we
also will adopt this practice increases. Thus, it becomes even more important that we evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of this trend now,
before it becomes even more deeply entrenched in
our collective judging paradigm.
Evaluating the “Fit” of the Research
Question in the Practice of Competitive Rhetorical Criticism
In order to conduct this evaluation, it is essential
to begin with Littlejohn‟s preceding description of
the inquiry process. By analyzing the progression he
describes, we can observe that two critical concepts
are central to it: (1) a linear time progression, and
(2) a step-to-step freedom to make choices at any
given stage of the process depending on what has
happened in the preceding stage. I will argue that
both of these essential components of the inquiry
process are impossible to achieve in a genuine way
within the current standardized rhetorical criticism
model.
First, the inquiry process mandates that the research question pre-date the selection not only of the
general body of theory the researcher employs
(Marxism, feminism, or whatever), but also – and
much more importantly – precedes the selection of
the particular rhetorical tenets (“methodological
elements” we often call them in forensics) the critic
employs in relation to the general body of theory.
Thus, the research question points the way to a general critical perspective, but does not immediately
mandate the selection of particular “methodological
constructs” (those appear later in the process). An
extended quotation from Ott (1998) helps to clarify
the point here:
Modern textbooks on rhetorical criticism survey
several methods. These methods are unified, not
by a set of narrow rhetorical tenets, but by a
general outlook. In Rhetoric and Popular culture, for instance, Brummett identifies five key
methods: marxist, feminist and psychoanalytic,
dramatistic/narrative, media-centered, and culture-centered. Brock, Scott, and Chesebro‟s Methods of Rhetorical Criticism is organized
around the methods of fantasy-theme, neoAristotelianism, dramatistic, narrative, generic,
feminist, and deconstructionist. Similarly, Foss‟s
Rhetorical Criticism covers cluster, neoAristotelianism, fantasy-theme, feminist, generic, ideological, narrative, and pentadic….All of
these methods exist, not as a narrow set of con-
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trolling terms, but as a general perspective on
discourse. Genre criticism generally examines
the shared expectations created by classes of
texts…and so forth. This scholarly view of method has two important consequences. First,
each method can produce an infinitude of distinct, yet valuable analyses. A feminist criticism
of a text, for instance, might look at repressed
desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for there is no single, prescribed way to
do feminist criticism. Second, any number of
methods could be brought to bear on a single
text, each yielding its own valuable insights. (p.
62, emphasis added)
Only after the critic selects her or his general method
(their broad critical outlook) does she or he start to
dissect the artifact, studying it closely in order to
then identify the particular critical constructs that
will be useful in order to dissect this particular artifact from this particular general stance. This brings
us to the second key issue at stake in our discussion:
the concept of intellectual freedom. To reiterate Ott
once more, “a feminist criticism of a text, for instance, might look at repressed desire, or phallic representations, or sexist language, for there is no single, prescribed way to do feminist criticism” (p. 62,
emphasis again added). The writer-critic must be
free, based on their analysis of the rhetorical text at
hand, to make choices about which specific rhetorical constructs will and will not be essential in order
to unlock certain aspects of the text (not all aspects)
from this particular critical angle, with no presumption being made that this is the “only” viable angle,
or even necessarily the “best” angle. In fact, the
words “only” and “best” are invalid and intellectually
stunting descriptors of the task being attempted.
Rhetorical criticism, as practiced in competitive
speeches, robs the research process of both its temporal flow and its intellectual freedom. We require
that students model their work after that of a more
“established” scholar. Accordingly, we require that
they select “a model” and use only the tenets (steps,
concepts, components) directly employed by that
earlier scholar when that scholar analyzed some other artifact. Ott (1998) again illuminates this process,
noting that “what passes as method in forensics is
simply one critic‟s analysis of a particular instance of
discourse. Although scholarly critics use methods,
such as the ideological perspective, their analyses are
themselves not methods (pp. 62-62).” In other
words, “feminism” is a “method” – but the particular
concepts used by author Jane Doe to study the feminist aspects of Artifact One do not in and of themselves constitute a “rhetorical method.” The pitfalls
inherent in this tendency to misdefine the word “method” are also noted by Ott, when he explains that
any given author “identifies certain principles at
work in the examined discourse, but those principles
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/ndcieproceedings/vol4/iss1/25
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are not a method. They are the scholar‟s critical observations, and when a student uses those observations as a method, the student critic is, in effect, pirating someone else‟s critical observations concerning a specific rhetorical artifact and forcing those
observations to account for another instance of discourse” (p. 63, emphasis added). Thus, by defining
the phrase “rhetorical method” in this manner, the
following holes in the intellectual process inevitably
arise.
First, students become hopelessly tangled in the
intellectual time-progression they should be following. They are unavoidably locked into an infinitely
regressive circle of action. They cannot choose a
question then choose a (general) rhetorical method
then choose relevant constructs, because once they
get to stage three (choosing relevant constructs) they
discover that those concepts have already been chosen for them. They can‟t choose constructs that fit
their research question, especially as that question
applies to the artifact they want to study. Instead,
they must follow the lead of the earlier author. And
that earlier author was trying to answer a particular
research question of their own in relation to a particular artifact of their own choosing. Logically, the
only way the student can coherently enter this circuit
is to use the same research question the original author pursued, and to apply it to a rhetorical artifact
that is as similar as possible to the original rhetorical
artifact. Doing this is difficult at best and impossible
in toto. And when the student tries to do anything
else, the process disintegrates completely. How can
they possibly answer a different question about a
different artifact using the same constructs? Again,
Ott explains this well:
Competitive RC is still caught in the 1960s model of methodological pluralism. Although student
criticisms are characterized by a wide variety of
theories, the overall approach to RC continues to
entail a narrow and reductionistic conception of
methods and to be animated by method. In forcing a narrow set of principles gleaned from a
specific rhetorical analysis to account for the
rhetoric they are analyzing, student critics tend
to fall into one of two traps. On the one hand,
many students mangle a critic‟s controlling principles until they fit the discourse they are analyzing. Some students, on the other hand, disfigure
a discourse until it fits the controlling principles
found in a published rhetorical analysis. Hence,
students shred their artifact by ignoring language that does do [sic] not fit the method and
by quoting textual fragments out of context to
create a perfect correspondence between text
and method. Competitive rhetorical criticisms
tend to lack any real explanatory power because
they force the practice to fit the theory, or the
theory to fit the practice. (p. 65)
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Locked into the use of another author‟s “method” (as the term is misdefined), student‟s must
resolve the time-progression problem by abandoning
the ideal of freedom. They must march lock-step
with the author whose work they emulate. Thus,
grasping one horn of the dilemma, students who
seek to answer their artificially-duplicated research
questions can only replicate the same answer discovered by the original author. The student can only
produce “unimaginative and unenlightening criticism” (Ott, 1998, p. 63). The only alternative is to
grasp the other horn of the conundrum and distort
the tool and/or the artifact in a way which produces
a “new answer” generated by critical misrepresentation. Neither horn is educationally appealing.
It is important to note that Ott observed this
problem arising prior to our contemporary addiction
to the research question. For him, it is generated by
our misdefinition of the term “method” alone. And I
agree with him. But I take the position here that this
problem is significantly exacerbated by the movement toward including research questions. At an
earlier time in our field‟s history, students and
coaches at some level “understood” that competitive
RCs were inevitably emulative acts of learning. They
have always been similar to the ancient practice of
“learning by imitation.” This style of teaching has a
long and respectable history in our field. It dates
back to the school of speech founded by Isocrates in
392 B.C.E., at which students relied heavily on imitating models in order to develop their own skills
(Golden, Coleman, Berquist and Sproule, 2003, p.
83). In the same way, competitive rhetorical criticism has long encouraged students to copy others
first (rely on the clusters of critical terms recognized
scholars in the field have shaped), learn from that,
then go on to do more “original” work. But our demand that students use research questions (as well
as the relatively recent escalation in the time allotted
to “critical conclusions”) produces a significant shift
in our mental imaging of the game. Students are now
being told that they must produce original questions
and reach original answers – but that they can only
do so by using absolutely unoriginal clusters of critical concepts (“methods”) developed by somebody
else to take some other intellectual journey. We are
asking students to do the ultimately un-doable.
Proposing a Paradigm Shift
At least as recently as the early 1980‟s, the typical competitive rhetorical criticism speech employed
a largely “imitative” approach to the study of rhetorical theory. It relied on requiring students to imitate/emulate the critical process followed by established scholars in the field in order to learn through
modeling. But in recent years, as we have deemphasized the importance of detailed “application
steps” and escalated the prominence of “critical conclusions,” as we have shifted away from canonical
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“mainstream” or “previously discussed” rhetorical
artifacts and toward the study of artifacts typified by
“recency, shock value, and obscurity” (Ott, 1998, p.
55), we have moved further and further away from a
primarily imitative approach to writing competitive
rhetorical criticisms and evolved toward a writing
model that edges closer to the academic inquiry
process. This evolution is clearly apparent in our
recent efforts to graft the research question (an element central to the academic inquiry process) onto
the competitive prototype. Accordingly, we are currently attempting (consciously or unconsciously) to
reap the benefits of two quite different types of
teaching/learning approaches: the “old” imitationbased style and an emerging “academic inquiry”
style. While either model in and of itself has value,
the two simply do not blend very well – and students
who attempt to travel down both paths at once are
very likely to end up writing speeches which distort
or misrepresent the learning process, the actual
“process-as-experienced” chronology of their work,
their understanding of theory, their operational definitions of critical constructs, their selection and
interpretation of data from the artifact, and the conclusions they attempt to reach.
I believe that we must abandon the attempt to
reconcile the irreconcilable and choose between
these two models. Or rather, we should make room
in this competitive event for students to choose
(based on their personal and individual levels of expertise, based on their personal and individual learning needs) which of the two writing models to employ when constructing any given speech.
There is no reason why every single rhetorical
criticism speech needs to cleave to exactly the same
writing format. If the goal of forensics is in fact to
educate students (we return to the philosophical
roots established for this paper at this point), then
we need to coach and judge all competitive events
based on their ability to enable student learning. Ultimately, I believe that we‟ve gotten our priorities
turned around. Overall, forensics events have
evolved to the point that a single ideal unwritten
prototype tends to define our thinking relative to any
given event. This prototype tells us in great detail
exactly what the structure, content elements, delivery, research base, topic choice and so on of any
given speech in any given competitive category
“should be.” These standardized prototypes make it
easier for us to coach any given event, easier for us to
judge any given event, and easier for students to
“learn the rules to win” in any given event. But since
when is education supposed to be about making
things “easy?” Granted, any student who follows the
prototype will learn “something.” But there are so
many things that the prototype cannot teach – and
so many students who will learn the prototype, perfect it, and then ask (in the words of the old Peggy
Lee song): “Is that all there is?” The answer, of
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course, is that is not all there is. There is so much
more to learn, if we‟ll just give ourselves permission
to teach it and our students permission to immerse
themselves in it.
Which brings us to a proposal. Let us make room
for at least two different prototypes in the event we
call “Rhetorical Criticism” (“Communication Analysis”). Students who feel that they can learn more
from the imitative approach at any given point in
their career should be allowed (better yet, encouraged) to revert to the writing style of the early
1980‟s, when comparatively more time and effort
were invested in the “application” step of the speech,
research questions were not expected, and critical
conclusions (which play a minor role in published
journal articles anyway) were minor or nonexistent.
Students who employ this model could “learn from
the masters” and dig deep into a set of critical constructs deemed coherent by an established scholar.
They would be held accountable for demonstrating a
clear, coherent, and detailed ability to understand
and apply a limited set of critical constructs. Yet,
even as we consider returning to this model, it is important that such a return should ideally attempt to
address and resolve some of the problems noted by
scholars at that time. For example, as noted by Givens (1994, p. 31), Murphy (1988) bemoaned the fact
that, even twenty years ago, too much speech time
was being devoted to the explanation and building of
method and not enough to actual analysis and application. According to Murphy, as of 1988 “judges
want[ed] an introduction to the method, an explanation of the method, an application of the method,
and methodological conclusions (p. 4).” As a result,
according to Givens (1994, p. 31), competitors made
“the methodology, not the artifact, the focus of their
speeches.” A return to a model which eliminates research questions and de-emphasizes critical conclusions would still face the challenge of optimally balancing the explanation vs. the application of theory.
On the other hand, students should also have a
second choice. They should be able to write speeches
which reflect a full and genuine use of the inquiry
process if they so choose. These students would produce work highly similar to what we see published in
our professional journals. They would start with a
research question, select a “method” (defined as feminism, Marxism, genre criticism, or the like), then
select a set of specific critical constructs which they
personally are convinced will operationalize that method for the particular artifact they have chosen,
then apply these constructs, then draw critical conclusions. In other words, the crucial difference between this second model and the style we currently
employ on the circuit lies in where the precise list of
sub-steps or critical constructs comes from. Under
this model, I propose that we abandon the search for
a particular article or book chapter written by somebody else which offers up a pre-digested set of
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/ndcieproceedings/vol4/iss1/25
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“steps.” These “steps” are in any case a sort of Holy
Grail which many authors don‟t really offer, even
though forensics conventions and terminology compel us to look for these “concrete lists.” These conventions pressure us to deduce or identify a “set of
steps” which often aren‟t there in the original article
to begin with. If we simply abandon the search for
the “perfect list” or the “ideal article” – if we rethink
our definition of and expectations concerning what
constitutes a “critical method” – then we can clear
the way to genuine critical inquiry. Students can
create their own “lists of steps,” select their own
clusters of “critical constructs,” and thus be empowered to ask and answer research questions in a
much more genuine way.
Ultimately, we are drawn back to the question of
what philosophy we wish to be guided by. Are we
really just “trainers” who can coach students to follow a set of rules in order to win awards? Or are we
in fact educators, who are determined to offer each
student who comes to us an optimal opportunity to
learn as much as possible from as many different
angles as possible in order to develop a cognitive
groundwork which will serve them well as they move
on toward the graduate schools (possibly) and careers (probably) and lives (definitely) which will follow the brief span of their undergraduate competitive careers? Consciously or unconsciously, willingly
or unwillingly, every choice we make as coaches contributes to the answering of this question – for the
circuit at large, and for the individual programs we
are invested in. Whether or not we include research
questions in Rhetorical Criticism is just one small
piece of this puzzle. We are certainly not defined as
teachers, or as a community, by the way we respond
to this one “narrow” conundrum. But the way we
approach the answering of this question, wherever
we ultimately take our stand, forces us to confront
basic issues we cannot ignore. How can we refine
any given event to ensure that it makes logical and
theoretical “sense?” How can we make sure that each
event exists not in “competitive limbo” but rather in
relation to our general field of study? How can we
use each event to teach our students things they
don‟t already know and skills that will serve them
well later? What responsibilities do we bear as educators?
References
Aden, R.C. Reconsidering the laboratory metaphor:
Forensics as a liberal art. National Forensic
Journal, 1991, 9:2, 97-108.
Burnett, A., Brand, J., & Meister, M. (2003). Winning is everything: Education as myth in forensics. National Forensic Journal, 21:1, 12-23.
Faules, D.F. (1968). The development of forensic
activities. In D.F. Faules and R.D. Rieke (Eds.),
Directing forensics: Debate and Contest Speak-

6

Paine: New Wine in Old Wineskins: Questioning the Value of Research Ques

National Developmental Conference on Individual Events • 2008

127

ing. Scranton, PA: International Textbook Company.
Foss, S.K. (1989). Rhetorical criticism: Exploration
& practice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland
Press, Inc.
Givens, A. (1994). Fostering greater analysis in rhetorical criticism: A re-examination of Whately‟s
views on rhetoric. National Forensic Journal,
11:2, 29-36.
Golden, J.L., Berquist, G.F., Coleman, W.E., and
Sproule, J.M. (2003). The rhetoric of western
thought (8th Ed.). Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Co.
LaMaster, G. (2005). Understanding public address
events. National Forensic Journal, 23:1, 32-36.
Littlejohn, S.W. (1983). Theories of human communication (2nd Ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Co.
McBath, J.H. (ed) (1975). Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective. Skokie:
National Textbook Company.
McBath, J.H. (1984). Toward a rationale for forensics. In D. Parson (Ed.), American forensics in
perspective, (pp. 5-11). Annandale, VA: Speech
Communication Association.
Murphy, J.M. (1988). Theory and practice in communication analysis. National Forensic Journal,
6, 1-11.
Ott, B.L. (1998). Bridging scholarly theory and forensic practice: Toward a more pedagogical
model of rhetorical criticism. National Forensic
Journal, 16:1-2, 53-74.
Ulrich, W. (1984). The ethics of forensics: An overview. In D. Parson (Ed.), American forensics in
perspective, (pp. 13-19). Annandale, VA: Speech
Communication Association.
Whitney, S. (May 5, 1997). Developmental conference resolutions, Proceedings for the Third Developmental Conference on Individual Events
[on line]. Available:
http://www.phirhopi.org/prp/devoconf/res.htm
l.

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2008

7

